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Income and Gift Tax Implications of Interest-Free
Loans Between Relatives1
In the recent decision of Crown v. Commissioner, the United
States Tax Court held that the use of interest-free loans between
relatives does not constitute a taxable gift from the lender to the
b~rrower.~
Only in Johnson v. United States4 had this issue previously been entertained; in that case a federal district court
arrived a t the same r e ~ u l tIn
. ~light of the Commissioner's contin1. This Comment, like the cases of Crown v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 1060 (1977),
appeal docketed, No. 77-1898 (7th Cir. Aug. 1, 1977), and Johnson v. United States, 254
F. Supp. 73 (N.D. Tex. 1966), deals with interest-free loans between relatives, although
it is equally applicable to interest-free loan transactions between friends. Interest-free
loans outside family circles, however, occur much more infrequently. (Congress and the
courts have dealt with interest-free loans that arise in a business setting. See note 6 infra).
2. 67 T.C. 1060 (1977), appeal docketed, No. 77-1898 (7th Cir. Aug. 1, 1977).
3. In Crown, the taxpayer and two brothers were equal partners in an unincorporated
company which had outstanding loans on Dec. 31,1967, of $18,030,024. They were demand
and open account loans on which no interest was charged, and were made to 24 trusts
established for children and cousins of the taxpayer and his two brothers. The Commissioner assessed a deficiency to the taxpayer's gift tax return for 1967, determining that
the interest-free loans were gifts of the use of the money. The value of these gifts was
calculated by using an interest rate of six percent and amounted to $1,086,408, or $362,136
for each partner.
The Tax Court rejected, for a number of reasons, the Commissioner's contention that
loaning money interest-free is a taxable gift. The court followed Johnson v. United States,
254 F. Supp. 73 (N.D. Tex. 1966), by impliedly finding that the right to charge interest is
not a property right under I.R.C. 4 2501, and hence there is no taxable gift where a lender
refuses to charge interest. The court also noted as grounds for its decision that: (1) although 5 2501 had been in existence for a number of years, the Commissioner had just
begun to assert the position he took in the case; (2) the courts have consistently rejected
efforts by the Service to subject interest-free loans to taxation; (3) policy considerations,
such as administrative manageability, should be considered; and (4) the determination
to treat the making of interest-free loans as a taxable event is a congressional, not a
judicial, function. 67 T.C. a t 1060-65.
Judge Simpson led a powerful four-judge dissent by asserting that the great breadth
of the gift tax provisions easily encompasses the gift of not charging interest on loans. He
also argued that: (1) the courts have previously taxed transactions where interest was not
assessed; (2) the Commissioner has a well-recognizedright to correct his interpretations;
and (3) a gift tax is legally appropriate in this situation, and it is for Congress to change
present law if it feels that the imposition of such tax is incorrect or inappropriate. Id. at
1065-70 (Simpson, J., dissenting).
4. 254 F. Supp. 73 (N.D. Tex. 1966).
5. The Crown majority stated that it was facing the "specific issue" dealt with in
Johnson. 67 T.C. a t 1062. I t should be noted, however, that the loans in Johnson were
made directly between parents and children, whereas in Crown the loans were actually
transacted between the parent's partnership and existing trusts of which the children were
the beneficiaries. Although both cases may be said to involve interest-free family loans,
this factual distinction may be significant in determining whether the Commissioner
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ued attacks on interest-free loans in general,6 it is interesting to
note how infrequently he has struck a t interest-free family loans.'
Even more surprising is the fact that when the Commissioner has
attacked such loans, he has attempted only to impose gift tax
liability on the value of the foregone interest. Altogether ignored
has been the income tax issue? Should interest income be imputed or allocated to the lender since interest-free loans may be
used by families to split income and pass economic benefit^?^
could force families to recognize interest on interest-free loans. See notes 52-56 and accompanying text infra.
6. For examples where the Commissioner attacked interest-free loans between related corporations based on the authority of § 482 and accompanying regulations, see
Kerry Inv. Co. v. Commissioner, 500 F.2d 108 (9th Cir. 1974); Kahler Corp. v. Commissioner, 486 F.2d 1 (8th Cir. 1973); B. Forman Co. v. Commissioner, 453 F.2d 1144 (2d Cir.
1972). In Joseph Lupowitz Sons v. Commissioner, 497 F.2d 862 (3d Cir. 1974), and J.
Simpson Dean, 35 T.C. 1083 (1961), the Commissioner attacked interest-free loans between a corporation and a corporate or an individual shareholder. In Pretzer v. United
States, 61-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 80,349 (D.C. Ariz. 1961), and Clay B. Brown, 37 T.C. 461
(1961), the Commissioner attacked, prior to the enactment of 8 483, interest-free installment sales.
7. See Johnson v. United States, 254 F. Supp. 73 (N.D. Tex. 1966); Crown v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. a t 1062-63. In Rev. Rul. 73-61, 1973-1 C.B. 408, the Commissioner
announced his nonacquiescence in the Johnson decision.
8. At present, there are no cases where a lender has been required to recognize interest
income on funds loaned interest-free between relatives. The Commissioner, however, has
issued a 30-day letter to the taxpayer in Crown asserting that the loans involved in that
case resulted in interest income to the taxpayer-lender to the extent of the foregone
interest. Brief for Petitioner a t 6, Crown v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 1060 (1977), appeal
docketed, No. 77-1898 (7th Cir. Aug. 1, 1977). The case is still pending in the Appellate
Division of the Internal Revenue Service in Chicago.
9. The terminology of "splitting income" is used in this Comment in its traditional
and common tax sense, i.e., an individual "splits" income when he shifts to others a
portion of what would otherwise be his taxable income. "Efforts to avoid progressive
income tax rates have led to the creation of numerous devices to spread a taxpayer's
income among several different taxpayers, often the members of his immediate family.
& L. STONE,
This spreading is usually referred to as the 'splitting' of income." B. BIT~KER
~ E R A INCOME
L
ESTATE
AND GIFT
TAXATION
341 (4th ed. 1972). Splitting income is normally accomplished with trusts, family partnerships and corporations, etc. Id. at 341-423.
There must, however, be substance to these income-splitting transactions; otherwise, the
courts will simply tax the income to its rightful recipient using hs authority the assignment
of income or the "substance over form" doctrines. See notes 60-74 and accompanying text
infra.
Since the borrower need not pay interest for the use of the money, there is a passing
of an economic benefit in all interest-free loan transactions. It should be noted, however,
that where the borrower generates income with such funds, there arguably has been a
splitting of income. This situation is distinguishable from those situations where no income is produced with the loaned money, such as where the borrower uses the funds to
buy a car or to obtain an education. Distinguishing between the fact that all interest-free
family loans pass an economic benefit while only some split income is relevant because
thus far Congress and the courts have not required an imputation of interest income to a
lender of interest-free family loans. See note 8 and accompanying text supra. They have,
however, required an imputation of income in transactions involving the splitting of income (e.g., trusts revocable within 10 years, private annuities, and assignments of in-
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This inaction by the Commissioner, in combination with the
Crown holding, leaves intact the use of interest-free family loans
as viable estate-planning and income-splitting devices.1°
This Comment will first illustrate how interest-free loans
may be used by related parties to avoid the income and gift tax
consequences of short term trusts, private annuities, and assignments of income. The viability of these illustrations depends
upon (1)whether Congress and the courts will follow the lead of
the Johnson and Crown cases by refusing to find a gift where
relatives loan money interest-free, and (2) whether the inaction
of Congress and the courts in not imputing interest income to the
lender of interest-free family loans will continue. Considering the
significant tax avoidance and income-splitting potential of
interest-free loans, reliance upon receiving an affirmative answer
to these queries may be ill founded. Next, this Comment will
discuss possible authorities that may be invoked by the Commissioner to prevent income splitting and to tax the passing of economic benefits that can be accomplished through interest-free
family loans. Finally, the Comment will explore the possibility of
legislation in this area.

There are a number of transactions which in substance are
very similar to interest-free loans between relatives. These include short term trusts, private annuities, and assignments of
income.ll When these transactions are compared with noninterest-bearing loans between family members, it becomes clear
that such loans provide a viable substitute for the enumerated
transactions. Thus, by casting any one of these transactions in
the form of an interest-free family loan, a lender may both avoid
gift tax liability and shift any income tax consequences that
would otherwise be imposed upon him.
come), and this imputed income may presently be avoided by the use of interest-free
loans. See notes 11-37 and accompanying text infra.
10. Although this Comment deals with interest-free loans, it should be noted that it
is just as applicable to low-interest loans, i.e., those loans charging interest below six
percent. Unless interest is charged on sales or loans a t a rate between six and eight
percent, a rate of seven percent is required by Q 482 (Treas. Reg. Q 1.482-2(a)(2)(iv), T.D.
7394, 1976-1 C.B. 135), Q 483 (Treas. Reg. 4 1.483-l(c)(2)(ii),T.D. 7394, 1976-1 C.B.135),
and other provisions of the Code which deal with interest rates.
11. This list includes the primary transactions that are substantively similar to
interest-free family loans. It is not meant to be all-inclusive.
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A. Short Term Trusts
In order to achieve overall family tax reduction, owners of
income-producing property often wish to pass the generated income to relatives who are in lower tax brackets. To accomplish
such income splitting and yet maintain control and ownership of
the property, taxpayers frequently use a short term or Clifford
trust.12In general, for a trust to qualify as a Clifford trust it must
be irrevocable for a t least ten years or for the life of the grantor,
and the grantor must not have power during that time to control
the income.13 If a trust so qualifies, the income of the trust is not
taxable to the grantor;" however, the grantor must pay gift tax
on the value of the income interest transferred.15 If the trust does
not qualify as a short term trust under sections 671-678 of the
Internal Revenue Code, the grantor, in addition to paying a gift
tax on the gifted income interest, is taxed on the income the trust
generates. l6
For example, assume that X transfers $100,000 in cash to
each of two separate trusts which designate X's son, Y, as beneficiary. Trust A, which is irrevocable for eleven years (or the life of
XI7), qualifies as a Clifford trust and directs that Y receive trust
income for the life of the trust. Upon termination of the trust,
either by revocation or the death of X, the corpus reverts to X or
his estate. Trust B also specifies that Y receive trust income for
the life of the trust, but is revocable a t any time and thus does
not qualify as a Clifford trust. Both trusts A and B deposit the
corpus in a savings institution a t 5.75% annual interest.
12. The short term or Clifford trust, also referred to as a grantor trust, is governed
by I.R.C. §§ 671-678.
13. I.R.C. 88 671, 673-674, 676-677. In addition, the grantor must not have "powers
of administration" as defined by 6 675.
14. Id. § 671. For the purposes of this Comment it is presumed that all trust income
is distributed currently rather than accumulated. Any income, therefore, is taxable to
either the grantor or the beneficiary, but not to the trust.
15. Id. §§ 2501, 2511; Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-l(c), T.D.6334, 1958-2 C.B. 627. An
irrevocable gift of an income interest is valued and taxed as a single gift at the time of
assignment rather than as a series of gifts each year as the income is recognized. Lockard
v. Commissioner, 166 F.2d 409, 412 (1st Cir. 1948); Helvering v. McCormack, 135 F.2d
294, 296 (2d Cir. 1943).
16. I.R.C. § 671. In those situations where the grantor of an irrevocable trust is taxed
on a trust's income, the assignment of trust income to the beneficiaries is still taxed as a
single gift a t the time the assignment is made. See Lockard v. Commissioner, 166 F.2d
409 (1st Cir. 1948); Sac Rohmer, 21 T.C. 1099 (1954). See also Galt v. Commissioner, 216
F.2d 41 (7th Cir. 1954). Where a revocable trust is involved, however, there may be a
question of whether or not there is even a gift. See, e.g., Estate of Leon Holtz, 38 T.C. 37
(1962). In such a case the grantor pays a gift tax each year as the gift is made.
17. The actuarial life of X, who is 72 years old, is 11.0 years. This value is obtained
from Table I, Treas. Reg. 6 1.72-9 (1960).
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In contrast, assume that two additional trusts, C and D, are
established, both of which, like trust A, are irrevocable for eleven
years and qualify as Clifford trusts. With trusts C and D, however, only a minimal amount of cash is transferred to establish
the trust corpus. Thereafter, X makes interest-free loans of
$100,000 to each trust. The loan to trust C is for a term of eleven
years, while the loan to trust D is recoverable on demand. Both
trusts deposit the money loaned in 5.75% savings accounts.
In substance, X has achieved the same economic results with
trusts C and D as with trusts A and B respectively, i.e., in trusts
A and C, X may not recover the money for eleven years, while in
trusts B and D he may recover it on demand. Moreover, in all four
trust situations the $5,750 annual income accrues to Y as the
beneficiary. The gift and income tax consequences, however, differ significantly. With respect to gift taxes, X will be taxed on a
gift of $47,040 in the case of trust A, l8 and on a yearly gift of $5,750
in the case of trust B. lg In trusts C and D, however, there are no
gift tax consequences since, following the Crown rationale, X has
not effectuated any gifts by only making loans to the trusts.
With respect to income taxes, the income of trust A is taxable
to Y as the income beneficiary; but since trust B does not qualify
as a Clifford trust, the $5,750 annual interest income is taxable
to X. The income of trusts C and D, which both qualify as Clifford
trusts, is taxable to Y. Yet trust D in substance is as revocable
as trust B since X may demand repayment of the loan at any
time."
18. See note 15 supra. The value, for, gift tax purposes, of the 11-yearincome interest
in trust A is determined under Treas. Reg. 4 25.2512-9(e) (1970). The regulation states
that the tables in Treas. Reg. 4 20.2031-10, T.D. 7077, 1970-2 C.B. 183, are to be used in
calculating the value of an income interest that is dependent on both the continuation of
a life and a concurrent term certain, as is the case with trust A. From Table LN of Treas.
Reg. 4 20.2031-10, T.D. 7077,1970-2 C.B. 183, is obtained the factor of .47040 for a 72 yearold male. (Table B of the same regulation, which gives the value of an income interest for
a term certain, reveals a factor of .473212 for an 11-year term. It is not surprising that
this factor is nearly identical to the above factor obtained from Table LN since X has an
actuarial life of 11years (see note 17 supra), which is also the length of the term certain.
If the actuarial life of the grantor, however, is not the same as the life of the trust, the
value of the income interest is obtained from the IRS as indicated in Treas. Reg. 4 25.25129(e)). The factor .47040 is multiplied by the principal of $100,000 to yield a $47,040 gift.
The amount of the taxable gift is then determined by subtracting the $3,000 exclusion of
I.R.C. 4 2503(b) from $47,040. (This assumes that X's spouse, if living, does not elect
under 4 2513 to treat one-half of X's gift as her own.)
19. The gift of $5,750, which represents the 5.75% annual return on the $100,000
principal, is reduced by the $3,000 annual exclusion under 9 2503(b) to yield a taxable
gift of $2,750. (This assumes that X's spouse, if living, does not elect under 4 2513 to treat
one-half of X's gift as her own.)
20. There are apparently no cases discussing the issue of whether interest-free loans,
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These hypothetical trusts illustrate that loaning money
interest-free to a trust is the economic equivalent of transferring
money or other assets into trust as corpus. By using interest-free
loans instead of trust corpus, however, a person may split income
without abiding by the grantor trust rules of sections 671-678, as
well as avoid the gift taxes that would otherwise be imposed. In
addition, the estate tax consequences to the lender are more advantageous when interest-free loans are used to fund a trust than
when the same money is passed outright as trust corpus.21

B. Private Annuities
A private annuity22is a common estate-planning tool typically used by parents t o remove appreciating or incomeproducing property from their estates and thus allow their children to,benefit from further appreciation or future income.23In
return for the property received, the transferee-child promises to
make annuity payments to his transferor-parent for the remainder of the parents' life. Under current law, the transferor is compelled to recognize as ordinary income the interest element of the
annuity payments.24This interest element, which the transferor
especially those where the grantor is the lender, should be treated as corpus of the trust.
If and when a court is faced with this issue, a logical result would be to treat such loans
as corpus for tax purposes. See notes 60-63 and accompanying text infra. Until authority
is promulgated, however, that treats interest-free loans as corpus, a lender may transfer
money into trust without abiding by the grantor trust rules of I.R.C. 00 671-678.
21. In all four trusts, A, B, C, and D, the $100,000 will be included in X's estate under
I.R.C. 06 2031, 2033, and 2038, since trusts A and B terminate on X's death (or sooner)
and trusts C and D involve loans which naturally are part of X's estate. With respect to
trusts C and D this is the total estate tax consequence, With respect to trust A, however,
X must also include in his taxable estate a taxable gift of $44,040 (see note 18 supra) plus
any gift tax paid on the gift if it was made within three years of death. I.R.C. 0 0 2001(b),
2035(c). These same results will occur with respect to the annual taxable gift of $2,750
from trust B. Although X will get a credit against his estate tax liability for any gift taxes
paid, id. 0 2012, the credit will not completely offset the estate tax on the same gifted
amounts (even though there is now a unified estate and gift tax) since the value of the
gift is taxed for gift tax purposes at the bottom brackets of the unified tax schedule,
whereas it is taxed at the top unified tax brackets when it is included in X's estate for
estate tax purposes.
22. An annuity is considered a private annuity when the transferee (i.e., the person
making the annuity payments) is not in the business of selling annuities. If the transferee
is in such a business, the annuity is considered a commercial annuity. I.R.C. 0 72 covers
both types of annuities. The distinction is important because of the different tax treatment afforded private and commercial annuities. See generally [I9721 195-2d TAX
MNGN'T(BNA)
23. The property is removed from the parents' estate without a gift tax because an
annuity is in essence a sale.
24. I.R.C. 0 72; Rev. Rul. 69-74, 1969-1 C.B. 43; Rev. Rul. 239, 1953-2 C.B. 53. See
generally [I9721 195-2d TAXMNGN'T(BNA) A12 to A14.

.
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must recognize on a pro rata basis as each annuity payment is
received, is the difference between the sum of all annuity payments and the present value of those payments.25In addition, any
difference between the present value of the property transferred
and the present value of the total annuity payments is considered
a taxable gift from the transferor to the transferee, or vice versa,
depending on whether the transferred property or the annuity
contract has the greater value.26
As an example of a typical private annuity, consider the
following: X, who is 72, transfers to Y $100,000 in return for Y s
promise to pay X $10,000 per year for X's remaining life (actuarially determined to be eleven years). Anticipated payments over
the eleven-year period total $110,000; however, the present value
of such payments equals only $64,123.27The transferor therefore
must recognize the $45,877 difference as interest income by including in his gross income $4,170 of each $10,000 payment received? In addition, the $35,877 difference between the fair market values of the property given (i.e., the cash of $100,000) and
the property received (i.e., the annuity contract worth $64,123)
is a gift from the transferor subject to gift taxen
Compare these results with the use of interest-free loans in
the same situation. X makes ten interest-free demand loans of
$10,000 each to Y , and each year demands repayment of one such
Under present law there would be no tax effects to either
X or Y X pays no gift tax under the Crown rationale, nor must
25. Technically, the total of the annuity payments is called the expected return and
is calculated by multiplying the annuity payment by the transferor's actuarial life obtained from Treas. Reg. § 1.72-9 (1960). The present value of the total annuity payments
is called the investment in the contract and is found in Table A(l) of Treas. Reg. 6
20.2031-10(f), T.D. 7077,1970-2 C.B. 183. By dividing the expected return into the investment in the contract, an exclusion ratio is obtained which reflects the percentage of each
yearly payment which the transferor may exclude from income. See generally [I9721 1952d TAXMNGN'T(BNA) A7 to A8, A12 to A14.
26. I.R.C. § 2501. See note 24 supra.
27. See note 25 supra. From Table I of Treas. Reg. § 1.72-9 (1960) is obtained the
expected life of 11.0, which is multiplied by the annuity payment of $10,000 per year to
yield an expected return of $110,000. From Table A(1) of Treas. Reg. 4 20.2031-10(f),
T.D. 7077, 1970-2 C.B. 183 is obtained a factor of 6.4123, which is multiplied by the annuity payment of $10,000 to give $64,123, the investment in the contract.
28. See note 25 supra. Dividing the expected return of $110,000 into the investment
in the contract of $64,123 gives a 58.3% exclusion ratio. Thus, 41.7% of each $10,000
payment is included in income.
29. I.R.C. § 2501. The gift of $35,877 is reduced by the $3,000 annual exclusion
allowed by I.R.C. § 2503(b) to obtain a taxable gift of $32,877. (This assumes that X's
spouse, if living, does not elect under 6 2513 to treat one-half of X's gift as her own.)
30. Alternatively, X could make one loan for $100,000 and allow Y to make partial
repayments. This would avoid the appearance of transacting what is in substance a private annuity in the form of interest-free loans.
,
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he recognize any income as the loans are repaid, since to date
there is no case or statutory law requring imputation of interest
on interest-free family loans.31X and Y have accomplished the
same nontax results with interest-free loans as they would have
accomplished by using a traditional private annuity, yet interestfree loans allow X to make a tax-free gift as well as avoid any
recognition of interest income as he receives his money back.
Moreover, demand loans provide greater flexibility by allowing
the transferor to demand repayment as he wishes, instead of
binding him to the fixed payment schedule of an annuity contract. The estate tax consequences of using an interest-free loan
in place of a private annuity, however, should also be considered
since they may be negative or positive.32

C. Assignments of Income
An assignment of income is simply the diversion of income
from the rightful recipient to another person, usually a family
member.33When only income is assigned, the law requires that
the assignor recognize the income for tax purposes since he, not
the assignee, earned or created the right to receive it.34If the
income is derived from income-producing property and the assignor assigns the property itself to the assignee, the assignee is
31. But see note 8 supra and notes 38-74 and accompanying text infra.
32. With respect t o interest-free loans, the loaned money will be brought back into
X's estate by repayment before X's death or by inclusion in his estate if the loans are still
outstanding a t his death. I.R.C. 6 2031. In the case of a private annuity, on the other hand,
the amount that will be included in X's estate is uncertain. If X dies before reaching his
actuarial life, X's estate has no right to receive additional payments (unless the contract
has a "guaranteed amount" clause), even though X's investment in the annuity contract
has not been fully recovered. If X, however, lives longer than his actuarial life, he will
receive back more than his investment in the annuity contract. The estate of X, therefore,
will be either larger by using interest-free loans in place of a private annuity, or smaller,
depending upon whether X dies before or after his actuarial life expectancy. It should be
noted that where X dies before reaching his actuarial life, the unrecovered portion of his
investment in the annuity contract effectively passes to Y without that amount ever being
subjected to gift or estate tax. (Certain adjustments to Ys basis in the property received,
however, may be required. See Rev. Rul. 55-119, 1955-1 C.B. 352.)
33. The primary purpose of assigning one's income to another is to split income, i. e.,
to allow the income to be taxed at the lower marginal tax rates of the assignee.
34. Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S.112 (1940); Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S.111 (1930). See
generally notes 64-74 and accompanying text infra. When assignment of income cases are
analyzed, two kinds of income must be considered-earned income and passive income.
Earned income is always taxed to the person who earned it, even though the income may
have been assigned to another. The taxation of passive income, however, may be shifted
in limited circumstances to another through the use of a short term trust or other device
without the assignor giving up ownership of the income-producing property. See notes 1216 and accompanying text supra.
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taxed on the income generated.35 Whether the assignor has assigned the income-producing property or merely the income, he
is liable for a gift tax on the fair market value of the property or
income assigned.36 Thus, if X has $100,000 in a 5.75% saving
account and assigns the $5,750 annual income to Y , X will be
both taxed on the yearly income and subject to gift tax on the
same amount. If, instead, X transfers the $100,000 to Y , X must
pay gift tax on the $100,000 assignment; however, the interest
income will thereafter be taxed to Y.
As with previous examples, the income and gift taxes imposed upon X by the law governing assignments of income may
be avoided by the use of interest-free loans. Suppose X loans Y
$100,000, which Y promptly deposits in a 5.75% savings account.
Based on the absence of any interest imputation under current
law and following Crown, X will pay no gift or income taxes in
connection with the transaction and Y will be taxed on the $5,750
annual interest income. As a result, X has effectively shifted the
taxation of the $5,750 annual income to Y without giving u p
ownership of his assets. In addition, where interest-free loans are
used a n d Y invests the loaned money in income-producing property, any appreciation in the value of such property that would
have been X's had he owned the property is shifted to Y. Although the use of such loans may require X to take money out of
current investments in order to make the loans, as well as require
Y to reinvest the loaned funds, the tax savings, especially where
passive investments are involved, may mitigate whatever burden
is involved. Also, the beneficial estate tax consequences offer further incentive for using interest-free loans as a substitute for an
assignment of incomee3'
35. This is the "tree-fruit" distinction promulgated by Justice Holmes in Lucas v.
Earl, 281 U.S. 111, 115 (1930). If the tree (i.e., the income-producing property), not just
the fruit of the tree (i.e., the income), is assigned, the income is attributable to the
assignee. If the assignor, however, retains too much control over the property after assigning it, he has not really assigned the tree, and will therefore be taxed on any income
generated.
36. I.R.C. $ 2501.
37. Where either an interest-free loan or an assignment of income is involved, the
principal of $100,000 is included in X's estate. With respect to an assignment of income
transaction, however, X must also include in his estate the annual taxable gift of $2,750
to Y and any gift taxes paid on gifts made within three years of death. I.R.C. $0 2001(b),
2035(c). The $2,750 yearly taxable gift is obtained by reducing the $5,750 interest income
by the $3,000 exclusion of O 2503(b). (This assumes that X's spouse, if living, does not
elect under 6 2513 to treat one-half of X's gift as her own.)
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The preceding comparisons demonstrate how interest-free
loans between relatives may effectively be used to shift income
a n d avoid gift and income taxes. In spite of this significant
income-splitting and tax avoidance potential, the untaxed use of
such loans has produced little litigation38and virtually no comment.39This Comment will now examine the possibilities for subjecting interest-free family loans to gift and income taxation in
order to close off what many would consider to be a substantial
tax loophole. It should be noted a t this point that although gift
and income taxes are two different taxes having their own law,
they nevertheless affect each other in many situations. For example, if the courts or Congress find or create authority to impute
or allocate income to the lender of interest-free loans, it would
necessarily seem to follow that the courts must reverse Crown and
impose a gift tax on the transfer of such imputed income to the
borrower. 40

A.

Gift Taxation of Interest-Free Loans Between Relatives

The question of whether or not loaning funds interest-free
involves a taxable gift from the lender to the borrower was answered in the negative in both Johnson and Crown. The more
recent Crown decision followed Johnson in impliedly finding that
the right to charge interest on money is not an interest in property
under the gift tax provisions of the Internal Revenue Code, therefore expressly holding that the forbearance to charge interest is
not a taxable gift within the purview of these provision^.^^ The
court concluded that it is a legislative function to make the fail38. See notes 7-8 and accompanying text supra.
39. The only substantial discussion of interest-free family loans followed in the wake
of Johnson v. United States, 254 F. Supp. 73 (N.D. Tex. 1966). See, e.g., Hooton, Gift
Tax Analysis of Non-Interest Bearing Loans, 54 TAXES635 (1976); O'Hare, The Taxation
of Interest-Free Loans, 27 VAND.L. REV.1085 (1974); 5 HOUS.L. REV.138 (1967); 65 MICH.
L. REV.1014 (1967); 19 STAN.
L. REV.870 (1967).
40. Where the Commissioner has imputed interest income to the lender in the past
he has allowed a corresponding deduction to the related borrower. Treas. Reg. 9 1.482l ( d ) , T.D. 6952, 1968-1 C.B. 218. If this occurs with respect to interest-free family loans
(i.e., the lender recognizes interest income and the borrower gets a deduction), it will be
very difficult to argue that the borrower has received no gift since any income earned with
the loaned funds remains in the borrower's pocket while the lender pays the income tax
on it. But cf. Commissioner v. Hogle, 165 F.2d 352 (10th Cir. 1947) (trust income taxed
to the grantor of a Clifford trust held to not constitute a gift from the grantor to the trust
beneficiaries because the grantor never owned or had any right to receive the income).
41. 67 T.C. at 1062-64.
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ure to charge interest on family loans a taxable event subject to
gift tax.42
Taking a contrary view, the four dissenting judges in Crown,
along with all the commentators on the earlier Johnson case,43
cogently argued that the right to charge interest is clearly an
interest in property subject to the broad gift tax provisions of the
Code. They also severely criticized the other bases relied upon by
the majorities in Johnson and Crown.44Because the competing
legal and policy considerations of imposing a gift tax on interestfree family loans have been adequately identified and criticized
by the Johnson and Crown opinions, as well as the previously
mentioned commentators, a further in-depth analysis of this
issue will be deferred to those sources in an effort to more thoroughly discuss the income tax issues.

B. Income Taxation of Interest-Free Loans Between Relatives
Although the imposition of a gift tax on the use of interestfree family loans has been attempted by the Cornrni~sioner,~~
rejected by the
and analyzed by the commentator^,^^ there
has been only brief r e c ~ g n i t i o nof~ ~the equally fascinating and
-

-

-

42. Id. For other bases of the decision, see note 3 supra.
43. See note 39 supra.
44. See note 3 supra.
45. See note 7 supra.
46. See notes 2-5 and accompanying text supra.
47. See note 39 supra.
48. See O'Hare, The Taxation of Interest-Free Loans, 27 VAND.L. REV.1085, 1092
(1974); note 8 supra. It should be observed that, while this Section of this Comment deals
with imputing interest income to the lender, there are a number of cases where the
Commissioner has tried to impute income to the borrower of interest-free loans. Joseph
Lupowitz Sons v. Commissioner, 497 F.2d 862 (3d Cir. 1974); J. Simpson Dean, 35 T.C.
1083 (1961). The courts in these cases rejected the Commissioner's contention that
interest-free loans from a corporation to its shareholders constitute dividend income to the
shareholders. These cases, however, are not on point when discussing the income tax issues
surrounding interest-free family loans; rather, they address themselves more to the issue
of whether such loans constitute a gift from the lender to the borrower. (The Crown
majority used the above cases for this latter purpose, although the dissent felt such
reliance was unjustified). The reason that Lupowitz and Dean are relevant to the gift tax
issue rather than the income tax issues involved in interest-free family loans is easily
explained. When money is loaned interest-free a benefit accrues to the borrower since he
has the free use of a valuable asset. In a business situation where money is loaned interestfree from a corporation to its shareholders or officers, it is arguable that this free use of
money is a dividend or compensation. In a family or nonbusiness situation, on the other
hand, the argument is that the benefit conferred is not compensation or a dividend, but
rather a gift. This is why the Commissioner tried to impute income to the borrower in the
business settings of Lupowitz and Dean while claiming a gift had been made in the family
transaction of Crown. Forcing the imputation of interest income to the lender (and a
corresponding deduction to the borrower), however, as in 4 482 transactions, is a different
issue than the issues dealt with in Crown, Lupowitz, and Dean.
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somewhat more complex issues of whether income should be imputed to the lender of interest-free loans transacted in a family
setting as has been done with interest-free loans arising in a business c ~ n t e x t *and,
~ if so, whether the actual income generated
should be allocated to the lender or whether a standard rate of
interest should be imputed regardless of the income actually generated with the loaned funds.50
The earlier comparisons illustrated the usefulness of interestfree family loans in allowing the lender to avoid or shift the incidence of income taxation. The use of interest-free loans effectively avoids the recognition of interest income that would otherwise accompany a private annuity contract. The short term trust
and assignment of income illustrations indicated the utility of
interest-free loans in shifting the taxation of income from the
lender to the borrower. Such shifting would not always be possible when using a trust or assignment of income.51The only way
to prevent this tax avoidance or splitting of income is to require
an allocation or imputation of income back to the lender of
interest-free loans. The question then becomes: Does authority
exist that can be invoked by the Commissianer to require such
imputation or allocation of income to the lender? Possible author49. See note 6 supra. See also, I.R.C. §§ 72, 482, 483.
50. There is a technical distinction between "allocation" and "imputation." Allocation is the assessment to the lender of the actual income produced by the borrower with
the loaned funds, whereas imputation is the assessment to the lender of a fixed percentage
of interest income without regard to whether any income is actually generated with the
loaned funds. I.R.C. 46 72 and 483 are examples of income imputation. On the other hand,
5 482 is an example of one instance in which Congress has given the Commissioner the
authority to allocate income between entities to reflect income correctly. The Commissioner has used his § 482 powers to allocate income between related corporations where
loans are made interest-free. I t is interesting to note, however, that the Commissioner, in
using his power to allocate income in such situations, has actually imputed income at a
fixed percentage without regard to whether or not any income was generated with the
loaned funds. See, e.g., Kerry Inv. Co. v. Commissioner, 500 F.2d 108 (9th Cir. 1974);
Kahler Corp. v. Commissioner, 486 F.2d 1 (8th Cir. 1973); B. Forman Co. v. Commissioner, 453 F.2d 1144 (2d Cir. 1972); Treas. Reg. § 1.482-2(a),T.D. 7394, 1976-1C.B. 135.
The reason given in the above cases was that since the interest-free use of money is a
valuable asset, the Commissioner could impute interest income without regard to what
the borrower did with the funds. This same reasoning would probably mandate an imputation method rather than an allocation method of assessing income to a lender of interestfree family loans. This distinction is significant since the imputation method would dictate that lenders recognize income in all interest-free family loan transactions, not just
where income is actually produced with the loaned funds. For example, 9 482, if held
applicable to certain interest-free family loans, would require a seven percent imputation
of income regardless of whether or not income is derived from the loaned funds. The
assignment of income doctrine, however, if held applicable to non-interest-bearing loans
between relatives, would require an allocation to the lender of whatever income is generated with the loaned money. See notes 64-74 and accompanying text infra.
51. See notes 12-21, 33-37 and accompanying text supra.

-
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ities which will be discussed are section 482, the "substance over
form" doctrine, and the assignment of income doctrine. A further
question must be considered when analyzing each possible authority: Does the authority require imputation of income in all
interest-free family loan transactions or just in those used to split
income?

Section 482 gives the Commissioner extremely broad discretion to "distribute, apportion, or allocate gross income . . . between or among . . . organizations, trades or businesses, if he
determines that such . . . is necessary in order to prevent evasion
of taxes or clearly to reflect the income."52Recently the Commissioner has used this statutory authority to allocate income between related corporations where one corporation loaqed money
to the other interest-free.53This same power could be used to
attack interest-free family loans. Since the statute, however, is
only applicable to "org&izations, trades or businesses," it is
doubtful that the Commissioner could reach those interest-free
loans made between individuals without any connection to business transactions. Although it appears that this requirement seriously limits the application of section 482 to interest-free family
loans, such may not be the case since most family loans of any
significant size involve the use of organizations, trades, or businesses. In Crown, for example, the interest-free loans were.actually made by the taxpayer's partnership to trusts established
for the benefit of relatives. Section 482 would clearly be applicable in this situation since the regulations under section 482 define
a partnership as a trade or business and a trust as an organizati~n.~~
Also, in view of the fact that an individual may act as a sole
proprietor and as such conduct a trade or business, it is probable
that any loans made between individuals for business purposes
or uses will be found to fall within the purview of section 482.55
52. I.R.C. $ 482.
53. See Treas. Reg. $ 1.482-2, T.D. 7394, 1976-1 C.B. 135; note 50 supra.
54. Treas. Reg. $ 1.482-1(a), T.D. 6595, 1962-1 C.B. 43.
55. The term "organizations" includes "a sole proprietorship, a partnership, a trust,
an estate, an association, or a corporation." Id. $ 1.482-l(a)(l). It may have even broader
scope, however, in view of the statement by the House Ways and Means Committee that
the reason the term "organizations" was added to the predecessor of $482 was "to remove
any doubt as to the application of this section to all kinds of business activity. H.R. REP.
No. 704, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 9775 (1934), reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. 554, 572 (emphasis
added). In addition, the courts have found 4 482 applicable to individuals by engrafting
"
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Only those loans made purely between two individuals where the
money is used by the borrower for personal purposes are likely to
be exempt from the broad reach of section 482. This section is
therefore a lethal tool the Commissioner may rely upon in requiring imputation of interest to the lender in a large number of
interest-free family loan transactions?
It should be observed that if and when section 482 is applied
to interest-free loans between relatives, the provision will require
imputation of interest to the lender in all business-related loan
transactions without regard.to whether the borrower actually generates income by using such funds. This interesting result is derived from the requirement imposed by the regulations adopted
under section 482 that interest be imputed, at a set percentage,
in all situations?' The Commissioner is allowed, therefore, to
"create" income in many cases, even though the express intent
of section 482 is to allow the Commissioner to "allocate" or
"apportion" income to more "clearly reflect the income" of an
a sham doctrine onto § 482 in order to establish that the individual was an "organization,"
"trade," or "business." Borge v. Commissioner, 405 F.2d 673, 675-76 (2d Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 395 U.S. 933 (1969); Rubin v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 1155, 1157 (1971), aff'd, 460
F.2d 1216 (2d Cir. 1972); Pauline W. Ach, 42 T.C. 114, 125 (1964), aff'd, 358 F.2d 342 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 899 (1966).
56. Another important question is whether the Commissioner would invoke the power
to allocate income or impute interest between family members even if he had the authority
to do so. Many policy and administrative considerations militate against interfering with
interest-free family loans (see notes 78-79 and accompanying text infra), and this may
explain the Commissioner's inactivity with respect to such transactions. Indeed, it took
the flagrant abuse manifested in the Crown facts to outweigh the Commissioner's apparent reluctance to attack family loans used to split income. See notes 3, 8 supra.
57. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-2, T.D. 7394, 1976-1 C.B. 135. The validity of these regulations was litigated in a number of cases involving interest-free loans between related
corporations. Kerry Inv. Co. v. Commissioner, 500 F.2d 108 (9th Cir. 1974); Kahler Corp.
v. Commissioner, 486 F.2d 1 (8th Cir. 1973); B. Forman Co. v. Commissioner, 453 F.2d
1144 (2d Cir. 1972). In the lower court decision in Kahler, Kahler Corp. v. Commissioner,
58 T.C. 496 (1972), the Tax Court held the regulations invalid and in conflict with the
purpose of § 482 insofar as they allowed the creation of income. The Tax Court maintained
that income could only be allocated between corporations when income was actually
earned with the loaned money, and therefore a tracing method must be employed to
determine what income, if any, was generated with the funds. Id. The Tax Court was
overruled in Kahler, as well as in Kerry and Forman, when the Eighth, Ninth, and Second
Circuits, respectively, found the "tracing" approach of the Tax Court unwarranted. The
circuit courts of appeals thus sustained the regulations and the "creation of income" where
there is no actual income to allocate. The Fifth Circuit has held similarly in Fitzgerald
Motor Co. v. Commissioner, 35 A.F.T.R.2d 75-832 (5th Cir. 1975). But cf. TennesseeArkansas Gravel Co. v. Commissioner, 112 F.2d 508 (6th Cir. 1940) (the attribution of
income between related entities was prohibited under § 45 (predecessor of 9 482) where
no income existed in the attributing entity). This latter case substantially predated the
rulings by the other four circuits which have passed on the issue, and therefore, i t is
probable that the Sixth Circuit would hold similarly if the issue were again considered.
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entity.58Thus, section 482 requires the recognition of a specified
amount of interest income by the lender, and a corresponding
deduction for interest expense by the borrower,59without regard
to whether or not the incomes of the lender and borrower are
thereby more clearly reflected.
2. Substance over form

Gregory v. Helveringso established the landmark principle
that the substance of a transaction, and not the form, determines
the taxable consequences of t h a t transaction. This principle
could possibly be invoked by the Commissioner as the basis for
allocating income to the lender where interest-free loans are being
used by the lender to effectuate what is in substance a nonqualifying short term trust, private annuity, or assignment of income.
For example, assume that non-interest-bearing demand
loans are made to family trusts which qualify as Clifford trusts
(as in Crown, where $18 million was loaned to twenty-four trusts
established for the benefit of the taxpayer's relatives61), and such
loans comprise a substantial percentage of the assets of the trusts.
Although sections 671-678 of the Code would normally allow the
income of the trust to be taxed to the trust beneficiaries, a court
should have no trouble in finding the trust to be revocable, in
substance, since the majority of the trusts' assets may be withdrawn a t any time by demanding repayment of the loans. To say
the trusts qualify under sections 671-678 as irrevocable because
the trust entities themselves cannot be revoked or the corpus
removed within the prescribed time limits, while the majority of
the assets may be withdrawn at any time, is to ignore economic
reality. The trusts should be considered revocable trusts and the
lender deemed a grantor under sections 671-678, thus requiring
the lender to recognize the income of the trust.
The same result could be found where interest-free loans are
used as a substitute for a private annuity. Although bona fide, if
the loans are interest-free and a pattern of regular repayments is
obvious, the court could find that the transaction is in substance
58. I.R.C. 4 482.
59. "[qf the district director makes an allocation of income, he shall not only increase the income of one member of the group, but shall decrease the income of the other
member . . . ." Treas. Reg. 8 1.482-1(d)(2), T.D. 6952, 1968-1 C.B. 218.
60. 293 U.S.465 (1935).
61. 67 T.C. 1060, 1061 (1977), appeal docketed, No. 77-1898 (7th Cir. Aug. 1, 1977).
Although the case does not expressly state whether or not the trusts were Clifford trusts,
it is reasonable to conclude that they did so qualify since otherwise the Commissioner
would not be trying to impute income to the lender. See note 8 supra.
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a private annuity and thus taxable under section 72 of the Code.62
As with section 482, the "substance over form" doctrine
would not be applicable to all interest-free family loans. Its use
would be limited to specific situations, depending on the facts of
each case, where the transaction under attack is substantively the
same as some other transaction taxable under the Code or some
judicial doctrine.63
3.

The assignment of income d o ~ t r i n e

Another possible theory for requiring an allocation of income
to the lender of interest-free loans may be found in the assignment of income doctrine established in Lucas u. Earls4 and
Helvering v. Horst. 65 The language of Horst summarily describes
the doctrine:
The dominant purpose of the revenue laws is the taxation
of income to those who earn or otherwise create the right to
receive it and enjoy the benefit of it . . . . Underlying the reasoning [of those cases where assigned income was taxed to the
assignor] is the thought that income is "realized" by the assignor because he, who owns or controls the source of the income,
also controls the disposition of that which he could have received himself . . . .66

Thus, if a taxpayer assigns income from income-producing property, or assigns the income-producing property but maintains
substantial control over the property or the income, the assignor,
as the substantial owner of the property, will be taxed on the
income produced, although the income is actually received by the
assignee.
This doctrine could possibly be applied to interest-free family loans to require the lender to recognize as taxable income any
62. This treatment, however, would be easy for the lender to avoid. By making minor
alterations, such as a varied repayment schedule, the lender could negate the appearance
of a private annuity.
63. An argument against applying the "substance over form" doctrine to interest-free
family loans is that such loans may be bona fide even though they charge no interest. In
such cases the courts may have difficulty saying that these transactions are not in substance loans just because they provide an excellent substitute for other transactions. A
loan is not a sham simply because it charges no interest. If there is substance to the loan
independent of the interest rate, it should be treated as a loan.
64. 281 U.S. 111 (1930). This case produced Justice Holmes' fruit-tree doctrine:
"[Nlo distinction can be taken according to the motives leading to the arrangement by
which the fruits are attributed to a different tree from that on which they grew." Id. at
115.
65. 311 U.S. 112 (1940).
66. Id. at 116-17, 119 (emphasis added).
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income produced with the loaned funds. To determine if the
Horst assignment of income doctrine is applicable to interest-free
family loans, it is helpful to use a three-step analysis. First, is
there an assignment of income-producing property when money
is loaned? Second, if the loaning of money qualifies as an assignment of income-producing property, has the assignor-lender of
the interest-free loans maintained sufficient control over the assigned property so as to be treated as t h e beneficial recipient of
any income from the property?" Finally, has income actually
been generated with the loaned funds?
With respect to the first issue, it can be argued that loaned
money per se is not in fact income-producing property because
income is only produced by invested or deposited money. This
argument is supported by the fact that an assignment of
potentially income-producing property has not been considered
an assignment of income-producing property in any case using
the Horst doctrine? In the cases where the Horst doctrine has
been applied, the property assigned was in fact generating income
a t the time of the assignment? Hence i t can technically be
argued that interest-free loans are not income-producing property
even though they have the potential to become such.
On the other hand, it can be contended that the substance
and not just the form of the transaction should be looked to, and
whether or not money is income-producing property should not
depend on such an attenuated subtlety (that loaned funds are
only potentially income-producing property) in light of the fact
that loaned funds can immediately be put to use as incomeproducing property. The distinction between income-producing
property and potentially income-producing property loses even
more of its persuasiveness in intrafamily, interest-free loan transactions since the related lender and borrower often decide before
the loan is even granted that the borrower will deposit or invest
the money to generate income.'O It appears that the more persua67. The assignor is the beneficial recipient of the income in that he diverts the income
from himself to others as the means of procuring the satisfaction of his wants.
[He has thus] equally enjoyed the fruits of his labor or investment and obtained
the satisfaction of his desires whether he collects and uses the income to procure
those satisfactions, or whether he disposes of his right to collect it as the means
of procuring them.
Id. at 117.
68. See generally J . MERTENS,
THELAW OF FEDERALTAXATION
§ 18 (J. Malone ed.
1974). A likely explanation for this result, however, is that no case has considered applying
the Horst doctrine to potentially income-producing property.
69. Id.
70. This is evidenced in Crown where the money was loaned between family members

172

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[1978:

sive view is that loaned money should be considered incomeproducing property subject to the assignment of income doctrine.
If the loaning of money interest-free is considered an assignment of income-producing property, then the second question is
"whether the [assignor-lender] retains sufficient power and control over the assigned property or over the receipt of the income
to make it reasonable to treat him as the recipient of the income
for tax purpose^."^^ In a traditional loan transaction, where the
borrower pays interest to use the funds, there is no question that
any income generated with the loaned money is taxable to the
borrower. The lender does not have substantial control over the
funds so as to be reasonably treated as the recipient of the income. But where a loan differs from the normal loan transaction
because it (1)charges no interest, (2) must be repaid on demand,
and (3) is intrafamily, it is arguable that the lender should be
taxed on any income generated due to the extensive control he
maintains over the income-producing property, i. e., the loaned
Although the enumerated characteristics in combination evidence the greatest dominance over the income-producing property, the primary evidence of control by the lender is the fact that
the loans are recoverable on demand. This is strongly supported
by the fact that a grantor of a trust is not deemed to have given
up control of the property for income tax purposes unless the trust
is irrevocable for a t least ten years (or for the life of the grantor).73
The fact that the loans are intrafamily points toward more control by the lender over the borrower than would be the case in a
nonfamily setting, although this element, by itself, would be insufficient to prove control if the loan was for a term in excess of
ten years.74The fact that the loans are interest-free does not technically go toward proving control by the lender, but without this
element there would be no question of an assignment of income
with no interest charge, and then simply reinvested in a different business of the lender.
67 T.C. at 1061.
71. Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S.591, 604 (1948).
72. These characteristics may vary without preventing a finding that the lender has
maintained substantial control over the income-producing property so as to be treated as
the owner for tax purposes. For example, sufficient control to invoke the assignment of
income doctrine could probably still be found where the loans are for stated terms of 10
years or less rather than demand loans. See note 74 and accompanying text infra. Also, if
a loan is interest-bearing, but at a rate obviously below the market rate, the assignment
of income doctrine should apply to such a loan transaction just as it should to an interestfree loan, allowing a credit, however, for the interest that is charged. See note 10 supra.
73. I.R.C. Q 673.
74. Id.
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since the lender would be receiving interest income. Again the
primary evidence of control is the term of the loan; where the
interest-free loan may be recovered on demand or within ten
years, it can be persuasively argued that the lender should be
treated as the beneficial recipient of any income generated with
the loaned money.
The third determination a court would have to make in finding the Horst assignment of income doctrine applicable to
interest-free family loans is that income has actually been generated with the funds. If no income is produced, then obviously
there has been no assignment of income. Even if income is generated there may be a question of whether it is measurable due to
commingling of the loaned funds with other assets. In such a case,
a court might either prorate income based on the relative values
of the commingled assets, or simply impute a fixed percentage of
income. Such proration or imputation is not part of the Horst
doctrine, but would be a necessary extension of the doctrine
where it is known that income has been produced but it is difficult to specifically identify and quantify it. In any event, the
Horst doctrine would thus be limited to only certain interest-free
family loans, i. e., those that generate income. This, however, may
be a desirable result since those loans which have the effect of
splitting income could be attacked without interfering with all
interest-free loans between relatives.

Whether or not the possibilities discussed above for imputing
income to a lender of interest-free loans are found applicable to
such loans, legislation may be desirable to affirm or reverse that
finding. One of the bases for the Crown decision was the court's
belief that the imposition of a gift tax on interest-free family loans
was a legislative duty.75If and when a co.urt faces the issue of
imputing interest on family loans which charge no interest, it
may well use this same reasoning to refuse to allocate income to
the lender of such loans. As a result, it is likely that Congress will
ultimately be required to determne the gift and income tax consequences of interest-free family loans.
With regard to the income tax issues, Congress faces a t least
three alternatives: (1)it can require imputation or allocation of
interest income in all family loan transactions where interest is
75. 67 T.C.at 1064
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not charged,76(2) it can require imputation or allocation only in
specific situations, or (3) it can do nothing.

A. Imputation in All Interest-Free Family Loan Transactions
The legislature could require the imputation of interest income to the lender in all situations where money is loaned
interest-free between relatives. This would specifically extend
what Congress and the Commissioner have already done, through
section 482 and the regulations thereunder, with respect to
interest-free loans between related corporation^.^^ In effect, this
alternative would require that family members charge their relatives interest on any intrafamily loan.
There are a number of significant implications and policy
considerations which militate against such legislation. First,
should family members be forced to deal at arm's length with one
another? The court in Johnson refused to do just that, stating
that "[tlhe time has not yet come when a parent must suddenly
deal a t arm's length with his ~hildren."'~Second, the implications that such an imputation of interest would raise must also
be considered. If parents must charge their children interest on
loans, must they not also charge for other family sharing, such as
using the family cabin? Furthermore, if family sharing without
charge is taxed, where would the line be drawn between family
sharing and support obligations of parents?
A third concern expressed in the Crown decision, which is
just as applicable to imputing interest income as to imposing gift
taxes on interest-free loans, is the enormous administrative effort
that would be necessary to impute interest on family loans which
charge no interest.7gThis seems especially troublesome in light of
both the doubtless widespread occurrence of interest-free family
loans and the general repulsiveness of having the government
interfere with such intrafamily transactions. (Nevertheless, this
third concern has not prevented the voluminous gift and estate
tax statutes and regulations which are aimed primarily at family
transactions.) These and other considerations would have to be
weighed by Congress in deciding whether to force the recognition
of interest in family loan situations as has been done in business
contexts.
76. See note 10 supm.
77. Treas. Reg. !! 1.482-2, T.D. 7394, 1976-1 C.B. 135.
78. Johnson v. United States, 254 F. Supp. 73, 77 (N.D. Tex. 1966). It should be
noted, however, that the Code is full of examples where Congress has forced-families to
deal at arm's length with each other. E.g., I.R.C. 4 72, 483, and the gift tax provisions.
79. 67 T.C. at 1065.
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B. Imputation in Specific Loan Transactions
Because of the many administrative and familial considerations which weigh against a specific percentage imputation of
interest income on all interest-free family loans, Congress may
decide to attack only certain loans. Basically, this could be accomplished by using an exclusion floor of a fixed amount or by
legislating only against those loans which are used by families to
split income.
With respect to an exclusion floor, any lender making loans
below a certain fixed amount would not have to recognize any
interest income on the transaction. This is currently done with
gifts, where a $3,000 per year per donee exclusion is allowed,80and
with section 483 transactions, where sales under $3,000 are exempted from its provision^.^^ The $3,000 exemption of section 483,
however, is imposed on each sale made by the same donor,
whereas the $3,000 gift exclusion floor applies to the total annual
gifts made by a donor to each donee. The aggregate method of the
gift tax exclusion obviously would have to be the type of exclusion
method employed with interest-free family loans since a loan
transaction could otherwise easily be fragmented to take advantage of an exclusion applying on an individual loan basis. Exclusion floors are often employed to give taxpayers relief; however,
a more realistic explanation is that it is more administratively
manageable and less socially disruptive to create such provisions.
Not only would an exclusion floor eliminate from administrative
concern the great bulk of intrafamily loans, it would also avoid
interfering with those smaller loans which are more likely given
to help a child get through school or buy a car. Thus, the imputation would only be required in larger family loan transactions
where the loans are more likely to result in a significant splitting
of income or avoidance of tax than a mere helping of relatives.
A second method of limiting the number of interest-free family loans subject to attack would be to legislate only against those
family loans which effectuate the splitting of income. This could
be accomplished by allocating any income produced by the borrower back to the lender. In essence, this is what the assignment
of income doctrine would achieve if found applicable to interestfree family loans; as with that doctrine, all loans which do not
generate income would be left untouched.
I t is questionable whether Congress should seriously enter- -

80. I.R.C.O 2503(b).
81. Id. O 483(f)(l).
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tain the thought of legislating against only those loans where the
borrower actually generates income with the funds. There seems
to be no valid basis for distinguishing between loans which are
used to produce interest income and those used to buy appreciating real property. Families would soon learn to use loaned funds
for non-income-generating purposes, such as buying a car or a
home, and to use their own money for any income-producing
ventures. On the other hand, this limited assault on interest-free
family loans may have merit in that it would confirm the use of
the Horst assignment of income doctrine as an attack vehicle,
while also providing some authority to at least cut back on this
substantial loophole.

C. N o Imputation i n Family Loan Transactions
A third alternative for Congress is to not enact any new legislation. This would not be an unreasonable decision in light of the
administrative and social concerns mentioned above. Congress
may well reason that the best alternative is to do nothing more
with interest-free family loans; the previously discussed methods
of forcing imputation or allocation of income are sufficient to
reach the flagrant income tax abuses of factual situations approximating those in Crown. If such a choice is made, a viable tool
will continue to exist with which the lender of interest-free family
loans can avoid or shift income, as illustrated in Section I of this
Comment.

The comparisons and analogies of Section II of this Comment
demonstrate the usefulness of interest-free loans as an estate- and
income-planning tool to split income and avoid gift and income
taxes. In addition to accomplishing the same economic results as
short term trusts, assignments of income, private annuities, or
other transactions, interest-free loans will often be more advantageous for tax purposes than the compared transactions. This is
forcefully born out by the facts in the Crown case and the analogies of Section I1 of this Comment.
To counter the viability of interest-free loans as a vehicle to
split income and avoid income and gift taxes, a number of alternative authorities could be invoked by the Commissioner to impose income taxation on lenders of interest-free loans. If a court
ever relies on one of the authorities discussed to impute or allacate income to the lender of interest-free family loans, it should
have little difficulty in also finding a gift from the lender to the
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borrower. This is based on the fact that the borrower physically
receives the income generated by the loaned funds but pays no
interest expense, while the lender is being forced to recognize
interest income. It is difficult in this situation to argue that the
lender has not made a gift to the borrower of the interest amount.
But unless and until the courts find and apply existing authority
or Congress furnishes new authority to allocate income or impute
interest to the lender, and unless and until the courts or Congress
define the making of loans interest-free as a gift, the interest-free
family loan will continue to exist as an excellent estate- and
income-planning device to avoid income, estate, and gift taxes.

Robert C . Hyde

